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CONFLICTING REASONS AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL
NADINE ELZEIN
Incompatibilism is often accused of incoherence because it introduces ran-
domness in support of freedom. I argue that the sort of randomness that’s
thought to be detrimental to freedom results not from denying causal de-
terminism, so much as denying what we might call ‘rational determinism’:
denying that agents’ actions are determined by their reasons for acting.
Compatibilists argue that introducing the ability to decide differently al-
lows agents to make choices that are irrational, and this undermines rath-
er than furthering freedom. I maintain that this argument neglects
scenarios in which reasons are in conflict with one another. In such scenar-
ios, we can preserve rationality without claiming that the agent’s choices
are rationally determined.
I
Introduction. It is often argued that incompatibilism must be mis-
taken because it requires the introduction of randomness to support
freedom. I want to ask exactly what is meant by ‘randomness’ and
why this should be considered problematic. Randomness of any
kind involves the denial of some sort of determinism. But there are
at least two sorts of determinism we might be interested in.
The first sort—causal determinism—states that all events are de-
termined by prior causes. Prior to the nineteenth century it was of-
ten argued that it would be absurd to deny that events are causally
determined: this was taken to imply that there are ‘uncaused’ events,
and this implication was considered intolerable.
Nowadays this in itself is not typically taken to be absurd: re-
search into subatomic particles has cast doubt on the claim that
causal conditions will always strictly determine outcomes. It may be
that the laws of nature are probabilistic rather than deterministic; so
whilst prior causal conditions seriously limit the range of possible
outcomes, they do not strictly determine the outcome. And this the-
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sis does not appear obviously absurd, and need not involve ‘un-
caused’ events.
But often the denial of causal determinism is (at least partly) seen
as problematic just because it is taken to imply randomness of quite
a different sort: the sort we get when we deny that an agent’s choic-
es and actions are rationally determined. It’s randomness of this
kind I want to look at.
If an agent’s choices and actions are rationally determined, then
they are determined not merely by prior causes, but by reasons to
act. Whilst it’s certainly possible for any agent’s actions not to be de-
termined by reasons, it is often argued that any such actions would
be so deeply irrational that we would consider them insane, and
hence we would not think that such actions were free.
It’s easy to see why causal indeterminism has been associated with
rational indeterminism. If we adopt the popular assumption that
reasons cause actions, then actions which are not causally deter-
mined cannot be rationally determined either. And if rational deter-
minism is required for freedom, then the incompatibilist must be
wrong to suppose that undetermined actions could be free.
Whilst I agree with the compatibilist that an agent cannot be act-
ing freely if their choices are deeply irrational, I reject the following
claim: that an agent’s choice could only be rational enough for the
agent to count as free if it’s rationally determined.
Whilst numerous compatibilist philosophers appear to make
some implicit assumption to this effect, arguments for this claim are
explicitly offered by only a few theorists. Historically, this claim is
explicitly defended by Collins (1717) and Hume (1740). And more
recently, Susan Wolf (1980, 1990) offers detailed arguments to this
effect.
II
Collins, Hume and Wolf. Whilst each of these theorists is committed
to the assumption that some sort of determining relation between
reason and action is required for freedom, they differ in their analy-
ses of what counts as a ‘reason’.
Collins argues that any ‘sensible’ agent’s actions are determined
by a desire to bring about the most pleasure and least pain. He
claims that any man who chooses misery over happiness has ‘lost
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his senses’, and hence would not be free (Collins 1717, p. 41).
Hume does not require that any rational agent must desire more
pleasure and less pain, so long as they can act so as to further their
desires, whatever these are. But nonetheless he notes that rational
agents are very predictable, precisely because they always act so as
to further their desires. He points out that the only agents who lack
predictability are the insane, and that we would not normally at-
tribute freedom to ‘madmen’ (Hume 1740, p. 260).
Susan Wolf’s argument differs from both Hume’s and Collins’s:
she requires not only that the agent can act so as to further her own
subjective aims, but also that she is able to act in accordance with
what is objectively valuable.
Furthermore, her account is asymmetric between praise and
blame: if an agent does do the correct thing, then we already know
she is able to. But in that case (unlike in cases of blame), she main-
tains that it would be absurd to require an ability to do otherwise,
since this would involve the worthless capacity to do the wrong
thing instead.
This would imply either that the agent can drop her well-
informed values on a whim, and adopt misguided ones instead, or
that she can act in spite of her values. Wolf contends that any agent
who could do either of these things would be insane, and that in-
sane agents cannot be free (Wolf 1980, 1990).
The differences between these theorists needn’t matter: we can re-
fute the claim that determinism of choices by reasons of any sort is
required for sanity (and hence also for freedom) if we can find an
example of an agent who would count as rational according to all
of these criteria, consistent with being able to choose differently.
This must be an agent who performs a praiseworthy action,
which both furthers his own desires, and reflects something objec-
tively valuable, and aims to bring about his happiness and avoid
misery, and where such an ability does not imply that the agent is
‘unpredictable’ in such a way that we might think he is mentally ill.
III
Conflicting Reasons. But it seems to me that these cases are very
easy to come by. This is because all of these arguments neglect an
important feature of decision making: reasons for action can con-
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flict. So sometimes there is equal reason to pursue two courses of ac-
tion, but it is impossible for the agent to do both.
This might occur because there is no difference between the two
courses of action under consideration. Scenarios of this sort are
called ‘Buridan’s Ass’ cases, based on Buridan’s famous example of
an ass standing equidistant between two identical bundles of hay.
Compatibilists often object to the use of Buridan’s Ass cases: the
decisions in question are trivial, and such scenarios are incredibly
rare, if not impossible. If rational determinism is taken to hold in all
cases other than these, then incompatibilist freedom will begin to
appear rather insignificant.
These criticisms seem fair. But ‘Buridan’s Ass’ cases are not the
only scenarios in which agents might have conflicting reasons for
action. Sometimes agents have good reasons to pursue two very dif-
ferent courses of action, and have no way to decide between them:
this need not require that the options are identical, just that they are
equally (or at least comparably) valuable.
Consider Sartre’s famous example of a student of his (who I will
call Pierre) torn between going to England to join the Free French
Forces and staying in France to care for his mother (Sartre 1946,
p. 35).
Pierre’s case demonstrates that decisions of this nature need not
be trivial. They needn’t be so rare either: conflicts of this kind basi-
cally occur whenever an agent has a difficult decision to make, even
where it is not such an important one. This happens any time there
exists a need to seriously deliberate about what to do. Whilst cases
of that sort occur very frequently, the significance of this aspect of
decision making is perhaps most strikingly apparent when we con-
sider examples of decisions that are both difficult and important,
where an agent may find it very hard to make up his mind, and may
be inclined to agonize over his choice. Pierre’s case seems to be a
scenario of precisely that sort.
But note that Pierre also seems to be perfectly sane and rational
by the standards of each of the philosophers I mentioned above,
even supposing he can choose either way.
It need not be true, as Collins argues, that Pierre has ‘lost his sens-
es’ or that his alternative involves choosing misery over happiness. It
may not be clear which of these two paths he should expect to make
him most happy, and this may be precisely why he feels so torn.
Similarly, whilst Pierre’s decision will be unpredictable, he will
CONFLICTING REASONS AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL 403
©2010 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cx, Part 3
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00294.x
still act to further his desires, so this need not, as Hume supposes, be
the sort of unpredictability we could only find in madmen.
And it need not be true, as Wolf contends, that Pierre’s values are
chosen arbitrarily, or that he can ‘drop them on a whim’ and adopt
flawed values instead. Perhaps none of these conflicting values are
misguided. They at least look perfectly intelligible. And whilst he
certainly acts in spite of some of his values, this is only in order to
further other values, and so once again, this needn’t be freedom-
undermining: he is perfectly rational since he would prefer to fur-
ther all of them. It is just his predicament that rules this out.
IV
The Denial of Determinism. Whilst the requirement of sanity cer-
tainly demands that reasons restrict the agent’s choices, then, it does
not require that they determine those choices.
In fact, this seems to parallel quite closely the sort of thing that is
commonly said to counter the accusation that any denial of causal
determinism would be absurd: whilst it would be absurd to deny
that causal conditions seriously restrict possible outcomes, we can
preserve the notion of causation without needing to maintain that
prior causal conditions always determine an outcome.
In a similar vein, so long as reasons restrict the agent’s choices, we
can preserve that agent’s rationality. We need not maintain that rea-
sons always determine actions.
The absurdity arises only on the flawed assumption that choices
which are not rationally determined must be impervious to reasons.
This is roughly equivalent to the assumption that any event that is
not causally determined must be impervious to prior causal condi-
tions, or that it must be ‘uncaused’.
Whilst it is absurd to deny the relatively weak claim that agents’
choices are causally and rationally restricted, then, my contention is
that we can, at least in some scenarios, preserve an incompatibilist
notion of freedom, without denying this. We need only deny the
stronger claim that actions must be rationally and causally deter-
mined, and this does not seem so absurd.
NADINE ELZEIN404
©2010 The Aristotelian Society
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cx, Part 3
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2010.00294.x
V
Incompatibilist Freedom. Whilst determinism (of either kind) would
rule out freedom as the incompatibilist sees it, the idea that actions
must be rationally and causally restricted merely limits the domain
of incompatibilist freedom—it does not rule it out. I say that we
should simply accept these limitations.
So, unlike most incompatibilists, I propose that we are only free
in the incompatibilist’s sense in cases of this kind. We could not
have this sort of freedom more generally. But I think this is an im-
provement on traditional incompatibilism.
Compatibilists are right to argue that where there is no reason to
do otherwise, it’s absurd to require the ability to do otherwise; they
are wrong to assume that this rules out incompatibilist freedom as
opposed to merely restricting it.
If the alternative in question is not supported by reasons that are
at least comparably strong, then I am willing to agree that the ca-
pacity to choose such an alternative is worthless: where one option
is clearly best there is no need to exercise incompatibilist freedom.
No effort of the will is needed to reach a decision. These are easy de-
cisions. The only capacity we need in these cases is the weaker abili-
ty to do what we want.
But the compatibilist goes wrong in assuming that all cases are like
this. In fact, the most significant decisions are the difficult ones: mere-
ly being able to do what we want does not settle anything in these sce-
narios because our desires themselves are in conflict. It is in these
cases that I maintain incompatibilist freedom may be preserved.
VI
The Appeal of Incompatibilism. Finally, I want to make some re-
marks about the respective appeal of compatibilist and incompatibi-
list accounts.
To many people incompatibilism seems intuitively very appealing:
it is often claimed that our default position, before we think about it
philosophically, is an incompatibilist one. But even if this is so, it
does not seem to be the popular ‘considered’ opinion of philoso-
phers. In fact, it’s strikingly unpopular with great philosophers
throughout history. So whilst our ordinary conception of freedom
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does seem to require alternative possibilities, this requirement seems
doubtful upon careful philosophical reflection.
I have tried to show that at least part of this doubt derives from
worries about rationality of the sort I have been considering, and
that these worries need not be as serious as has often been thought.
But I also maintain that the traditional compatibilist view does
not seem to capture all of the important features of freedom as we
usually conceive of it. It sometimes feels as if various possible fu-
tures are genuinely (not merely counterfactually) open to us, as
things stand. This feeling is most striking when we are struggling to
make a very difficult choice.
I suspect that compatibilism is popular, then, not because it plau-
sibly captures our ordinary conception of freedom, but because the
incompatibilist view looks incoherent upon serious reflection. And I
think this is, at least in part, because traditional incompatibilism
goes a step too far.
Whereas traditional incompatibilists have argued that free agents
must have the capacity to decide differently in every situation, I
maintain that this capacity only matters in some situations, but in
many situations the traditional compatibilist picture does capture
the sort of freedom that matters.
Classically, compatibilists have suggested that we have the free-
dom solely to act on the basis of our decisions, but not a capacity to
decide differently. Our confusion, according to the compatibilist, is
to think we can decide differently as things stand, when really we
have just a counterfactual capacity, to act differently if we want to.
But it seems strange to suppose that when we take ourselves to be
free in the incompatibilist’s sense, we really are supposing that as
things stand, we are able to or would even want the ability to decide to
do things we presently have no desire to do. Where there is no obvious
value to deciding differently, we are unlikely to be gripped by strong
feelings that we are deciding freely in the incompatibilist’s sense.
Rather, it feels as if we are free in the incompatibilist’s sense when it
is not obvious which path is most valuable, or which decision is best.
It feels as if the future is genuinely, and not merely counterfactually,
open, as things stand, when we are making very hard decisions, and
we feel genuinely torn. It seems, then, that there is a lot to be gained by
restricting incompatibilist freedom to scenarios of this sort.
Firstly, it seems that it’s these scenarios involving conflicting rea-
sons (and not the scenarios in which it is obvious what to do) that
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drive our incompatibilist intuitions, and so if we can preserve incom-
patibilist freedom in scenarios of this sort, then we can do justice to
those intuitions without committing ourselves to any absurdities.
Secondly, it seems as if restricting incompatibilist freedom to such
scenarios respects the way in which reason should limit the range of
actions a sane agent might choose, and so this strategy also allows
us to respect the intuitive view that sanity is a condition of free will,
and to do so without simply failing to capture important features of
freedom as we ordinarily understand it.
So whilst the view I end up with does stress incompatibilist free-
dom, it does not insist we always have such freedom. Instead I pro-
pose that such freedom is both appealing and fairly unproblematic,
but only if its presence is restricted to those scenarios in which this
sort of ability really matters. And I have further tried to sketch out,
at least roughly, what the distinctive features of such scenarios are.
The weaker, conditional, ability emphasized by traditional compati-
bilists is not considered irrelevant on this view either: it captures the
kind of ability that is important in other scenarios, where there is lit-
tle value in choosing any alternative course of action. Neither of
these abilities on their own then, can provide an exhaustive account
of the sort of capacities that matter for freedom.1
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